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“The computer says no”: the demise of the traditional bank manager and 
the depersonalisation of British banking, 1960-2010 
This article examines the role of the British bank branch manager in the context of the 
transformation of banking since the 1980s and discusses its implications for British 
banking. The analysis was based on interviews with retired bank managers and 
suggests that they viewed their role as being was based on skill, authority and 
autonomy. The centralisation of authority and increasing targets deskilled and 
disempowered their profession. Drawing on Weber’s theory of bureaucratisation, this 
article argues that the loss of agency of managers depersonalised service provision as 
they no longer could base their decisions on personal considerations. 
Keywords: banking history; professions; management; organisational change; 
bureaucracy 
 
The British bank branch manager has significantly influenced people’s experiences of 
banking after WWII. He or she would interview people applying for loans and opening up 
accounts. The branch manager was generally seen as an important figure in the local 
community, sitting on parole committees and school boards.1 The bank branch manager also 
epitomises the decline of traditional, community-based banking in popular culture through 
depictions in films, TV series and adverts. Yet, whilst the post-war changes in British 
banking have been extensively covered, in academic circles scant attention has been given to 
development of the role of the bank branch manager in the same period. 
Instead, the business history of British banking has been predominantly written from 
an elite perspective. Historical accounts of banking tend to be macro-level accounts focusing 
on influential chief executives and chairmen, or drawing on formal bank documents and 
statistics.2 Frontline, ordinary banking staff are often treated as faceless, inconsequential and 
passive bystanders. The studies that do focus on the experiences and views of customers and 
frontline staff are largely autobiographical or journalistic accounts.3 The studies by McCabe,4 
and Knights and McCabe,5 which explore the perspectives and experiences of bank staff to 
changing discourse, strategies and organisational structures, are notable exceptions to this. 
Additionally, the study by Halford, Savage and Witz draws on interviews with bank staff to 
analyse the evolving role of women in British banking.6 It is argued that it is important to 
address this dearth in the academic research because understanding the judgements and 
behaviour of staff matter in two regards. First, frontline banking staff have historically 
exercised considerable discretion over service provision, especially business lending, even up 
until recently. In her study of the business lending decision-making by Scottish bank branch 
managers in the early 1990s, Fletcher found that the managers had a great deal of autonomy 
to make lending decisions.7 Similarly, credit scoring was not used in enterprise lending by the 
UK clearing bank researched by Hughes in the late 1980s.8 Second, workers can potentially 
affect the implementation and operation of formal systems. Based on the implementation of 
management strategies in a British financial services company, Storey argues that companies’ 
search for management control over the workforce is constrained by workers’ resistance.9 
Similarly, branch staff in a UK bank that centralised back-office operations into processing 
centres showed resistance against the process by encouraging customers to complain about 
the processing centres.10 
This article addresses this dearth in the academic research in two ways. First, it 
analyses the development of the role of the bank branch manager amidst the transformation 
of British retail banking in the 1980s onwards. Second, it discusses the implications for the 
relationship between banks and their customers rooted in Max Weber’s ideal type of 
bureaucracy. The original contribution of this article is in the conceptualisation and analysis 
of the depersonalisation of banking rooted in the agency, or loss of agency, exercised by the 
traditional gatekeeper to banking services: the bank branch manager. This is important 
because the standing and trustworthiness of banks has historically depended on their links to 
and perceived image in local communities.11 At the same time, there have been a number of 
changes in banking that has reinforced their public perception as increasingly remote from 
communities including branch closures, call centres and remote banking. 
The focus of the article is on retail banking, the delivery of financial services12 
directly to consumers in the form of households and small businesses, and on the role of the 
manager of the domestic retail branch. The British clearing banks dominated retail banking, 
especially banking and transaction services and SME lending. However, it is important to 
note that British banks also developed investment and retail banking operations abroad in the 
period in question. In 1974, the board of Midland agreed that priority should be given to 
increasing profits from and developing its international banking business.13 Similarly, the 
share of the Barclays group assets in international banking stood at 42% in 1970 and 56% by 
1980.14 Indeed, it was only after the international debt crisis of the early 1980s that British 
banks, and especially Lloyds, started fully concentrating on domestic markets.15 
The remainder of this article is organised into five sections. Section 2 outlines a 
conceptual framework in which the implications of developments in the role of the bank 
branch manager for bank-customer relationships are discussed. The framework is rooted in 
Weber’s concepts of rationalisation, bureaucratisation and the dehumanisation of 
administration and decision-making. Section 3 details the methods and data used in the 
article. Section 4 provides an overview of the transformation of British banking since the 
1980s. Drawing on the perspectives and experiences of the interviewees, Section 5 defines 
and discusses the core elements of the role and position of the bank branch manager, and 
Section 6 explores how the branch managers were affected by the changes in banking. 
Section 7 concludes and discusses the implications of the findings using Weber’s theory of 
bureaucratisation and dehumanisation.  
Weber, bureaucratisation and depersonalisation 
Weber’s thesis of bureaucratisation has been highly influential in organisational research on 
businesses and is considered by some as the father of organization theory.16 It has been used 
to theorise how there is a strong drive towards homogenisation of sectors beyond market and 
efficiency through institutional isomorphism,17 to argue that bureaucratisation and 
rationalisation manifests itself in contemporary society through the widespread adoption of 
the business model of the fast-food chain McDonald’s,18 to account for charismatic 
leadership in business organisations19 as well as a plethora of empirical papers testing 
Weber’s hypotheses.20 
In this article, Weber’s thesis of bureaucratisation is used to conceptualise and analyse 
the role of the bank branch manager in shaping customer experiences and perceptions of 
banking. Specifically, Weber’s framework is used to conceptualise what is meant by personal 
and impersonal, and the role of agency in distinguishing between the two. It is important to 
note that there already is a literature on dehumanisation and numericalization but this 
primarily relates to the dehumanisation of work organisation and the relationship and 
interactions between managers and subordinates and colleagues.21 Haslam distinguishes 
between animalistic, involving viewing other with contempt or disgust, and mechanistic 
dehumanization, which involves taking an indifferent, rational and objective orientation 
towards other people.22 McCabe sees numericalization as an element of dehumanisation that 
‘is grounded in discourses and disciplines such as accounting, operations, technology and 
strategy.’23 
To fully understand Weber’s concepts of rationalisation and bureaucratisation, one 
needs to examine the intimately linked phenomenon of modern capitalism. Indeed, Weber 
developed his thesis of bureaucratisation to account for the development of modern 
capitalism in Europe, which he sees as distinct from elsewhere and at other times.24 Weber 
sees rationalisation, bureaucratisation and capitalism as intimately linked. On the one hand, 
bureaucracy ’is fully developed...in the private economy only in the most advanced 
institutions of capitalism’.25 Administrative tasks carried out by salaried workers is ‘not only 
more precise but, in the last analysis, it is often cheaper than formally remunerated honorific 
service’.26 On the other, capitalism is dependent on rationalisation as the rational pursuit of 
profit, through fixed capital and certainty of calculations, which depends on a calculable legal 
system and formal rules.27 The uniqueness of modern capitalism in the West comes from its 
orientation towards ‘instrumental rationality...that is, deliberate planning.’28 Deliberate 
planning, in turn, requires predictability and calculability. 
In Weber’s ideal type model of bureaucratisation, which he sees as the main 
manifestation of Western capitalism, activities are distributed in a fixed way as official duties 
and there is a hierarchical organisation of offices and duties, whereby higher offices have 
authority over lower offices but in a stable way constrained by rules. Conversely, in non-
bureaucratic administrations, functions and duties are linked to ’social, material, or honorific 
preferences and ranks.’29 Bureaucratisation breaks with non-rational interpretation of law 
prevalent in non-bureaucratic forms of administration. Bureaucracy accompanies modern 
mass democracy in that it is linked to equality before the law and a rejection of the case-by-
case approach to decision-making, which according to Weber is characterised by 
’arbitrariness and lordly discretion.’30 The impersonal and functional loyalty of 
administrative workers in bureaucratic administrations underpins the levelling of social 
differences and the move from case-to-case judgements to rule-bound impersonal decisions. 
The essence of bureaucratisation is, according to Weber, that it dehumanises 
management and administration: 
Bureaucratization offers above all the optimum possibility for carrying through the 
principle of specializing administrative functions according to purely objective 
considerations... 'Objective' discharge of business primarily means a discharge of 
business according to calculable rules and 'without regard for persons'31 
In non-bureaucratic entities, then, there is consideration for those persons who are 
directly or indirectly affected by or involved in the execution of tasks. On the one hand, it can 
involve concern for the person, such as his or her perceived character (e.g. industriousness, 
thriftiness etc.), perceived status or standing (e.g. class, profession etc.), appearance (e.g. 
physical traits, clothing etc.) or association (e.g. kinship or family ties, dependency 
relationships etc.). On the other, the consideration may be for the circumstances in which the 
person finds him or herself, such as plight, desperation, comfort or strength. The implication 
of such consideration is that people may act out of loyalty, fear, admiration or other feelings 
towards the individual or out of sympathy, pity, envy or empathy for the circumstances in 
which the person find him or herself. This means that it is possible to have decisions driven 
by solidarity, loyalty and compassion, but also of nepotism, discrimination and favouritism. 
This may apply even where one is judging seemingly objective aspects of a case such as 
capability and effectiveness. It opens up for exercising morality-driven judgements, including 
of propriety, thrift, and types of people and circumstances that are deserving and capable. 
Conversely, in bureaucracies such factors are taken into account only when concomitant with 
organisational objectives, in which case they would be defined in an objective and rational 
manner. 
In turn, the ability to base decisions on personal considerations is premised on a 
certain level of discretion, the freedom and ability to use one’s judgement, on part of the 
person executing the tasks and making the decisions. In bureaucracy, conversely, there is a 
uniform treatment of cases – based on Weber’s emphasis on the levelling of social 
differences – and a standardised execution of tasks. The criteria on which decisions are made 
and tasks executed are uniform and calculable. Administration and decisions are rational in 
the sense that they are planned activities, or at least conducive to planning, to achieve 
organisational objectives. 
Methodology and data 
This article considers the development of the role of the manager of the domestic retail bank 
branch and the implications for banking using Weber’s theory of bureaucratisation. The 
methodology applied to do this is based on an interpretivist approach. It is held that views 
and perceptions matter because they reveal meaning and contain important contextual 
information. Man, it is recognised, is self-conscious and acts accordingly. Within the 
interpretivist tradition, this study is rooted in subtle or analytical realism.32 These forms of 
realism recognise the importance of perspectives of the researcher and the researched but do 
not subscribe to the view that everything is relative and that the researcher can make no 
credible claims as it is ultimately based on someone’s interpretation. 
The primary method of collecting data consisted of oral history interviews with bank 
branch managers. Oral history is defined as ‘primary source material obtained by recording 
the spoken word – generally by means of planned, tape-recorded interviews – of persons 
deemed to harbor hitherto unavailable information worth preserving’.33 Where possible the 
testimonies by branch managers were cross-referenced with archival material. However, 
visits to the archives of three of the banks in the study – Midland/HSBC, Lloyds and Barclays 
– revealed that there were few documents describing existing banking practices and 
reorganisations. Further, access was limited because of the 30-year embargo banks impose on 
access to documents held in their archives. Hence, existing academic and historical accounts 
of banking were used to a greater extent in corroborating and challenging the oral testimonies 
rather than archival material. 
There are a number of limitations with the oral history interview. Oral history 
interviews are not considered to be reliable for developing a chronological account of events 
because it is dependent on recall and memory, how people remember and talk about past 
events is coloured by recent events, and interviewees may struggle to distinguish between 
their own experiences of events from those that they may have read about.34 However, the 
oral history interview is in many ways ideal from a sociological point of view because it 
provides interpretation and perspectives of the branch managers. They may also reveal 
important aspects not captured in documents, such as how changes were perceived and 
viewed by staff and customers. 
The interviews took the form of semi-structured face-to-face interviews with retired 
bank managers lasting between 50 minutes and two hours covering their career, changes in 
banking and how they experienced these changes. In total 32 interviews were conducted 
(Table 1). 
[Insert table 1 here] 
Out of the interviewees, 18 were from Midland Bank or HSBC, 10 were from 
Barclays, two were from Lloyds and the remaining two were from a smaller bank outside of 
the Big Four (Barclays, Lloyds, NatWest and HSBC) and a building society. Twenty-five of 
the interviewees were former bank branch managers, whilst one was a branch manager of a 
building society. With two exceptions, all the branch managers were male. Seven of the bank 
branch managers worked for Barclays, 16 Midland or HSBC and two from Lloyds and a 
smaller bank. The interviewees constituted a self-selecting sample responding to calls issued 
in the retirement magazines of Barclays and HSBC, whilst five of interviewees were recruited 
through friends and acquaintances. 
The majority were employees of Barclays and Midland Bank and none from NatWest. 
Consequently there is a geographical predominance in the Midlands, the heartland of 
Midland Bank. As such the findings cannot be generalised to the population of bank branch 
managers or banks. Instead the intention is to develop a rich and holistic account of the role 
of the bank branch manager identifying lessons and implications for similar settings. In 
addition to issues of the representativeness of the interviewees, it is important to note that the 
bank branch manager represents a partial and slanted view of developments in banking. 
The sampling strategy was designed to produce a sample containing the experiences 
of branch managers from across the different banks operating in Britain. However, it is 
important to note that the aim was not to produce a sample that was representative to draw 
inferences for a wider population of branch managers. The recruitment of interviewees 
continued until it had produced a solid understanding of what was going on and the 
researcher felt confident that an explanation could be generated. Mason refers to this as the 
‘theory-saturation point.’ It was driven by a desire to understand a process rather than 
represent a population in some probabilistic manner.35 
 
The transformation of British banking 
The banking sector into which the interviewees entered (mostly) in the 1950s and 1960s was 
seen as uncompetitive, inefficient and conservative.36 Banks did not disclose profits, interest 
rates were set by cartels and there was very little competition across different market 
segments, including mortgages, savings, bank accounts, business loans and consumer 
credit.37 They were conservative and patriarchal institutions.38 Although banks hired a large 
and growing proportion of female workers, it was a male-dominated work environment 
where only men had any realistic prospects of promotion beyond clerical roles.39 Banks acted 
as the prudent and paternalistic custodians of the money of middle and upper class 
households.40 As late as in the early 1970s, only about two fifths of adults had a current 
account compared with over 90% today.41 The Big Four British clearing banks had large 
branch networks peaking at over 11,000 branches in 1978, which they used to compete for 
retail deposits and customers.42 In part because of the lack of competitive pressures on costs, 
banking was highly labour intensive. 
The branch was the ’foundation stone for retail banking’ gathering intelligence on 
local markets and customers, processing and settling the day’s business, and serving as a 
gateway for accessing services.43 The structure of the branches managed by the interviewees 
would have remained largely unchanged until the 1980s and 1990s. Bank branches were 
autonomous determining access to financial services and underwriting, originating and 
monitoring services within certain limits and controls. Branches offered a limited range of 
financial services, namely bank accounts, cheques, credit cards, cheque guarantee cards, 
business loans and, after the secondary banking crisis in the early 1970s, hire purchase and 
other forms of consumer finance. There were very few centrally designed and determined 
services.44 The income of the branch was generated from fees for banking and transaction 
services, and business lending. 
In the 1980s and 1990s, the culmination of a range of political, societal, cultural, 
economic and technological factors led to the transformation of British branch banking. From 
offering a small range of financial services to middle class customers and businesses through 
their branch networks, British banks turned into 
financial conglomerates, participating in investment and merchant banking business with 
the corporate sector and international banking business, on the one hand, and providing a 
whole array of retail financial services through financial supermarkets on the other45 
There were two key developments driving the transformation of banking. First, there was a 
change in the way in the regulation of financial markets. Banks were pressurised to disclose 
profits, the interest rate cartels abolished, asset restrictions lifted and barriers between 
different markets eased. These changes led to an intensification of competition between 
financial institutions that had previously operated in separate markets,46 the emergence of 
price competition47 and the diversification of the services offered by banks and other 
providers. It should be noted that the extent to which these changes led to increased 
competition is highly contested, with some authors suggesting that banks became financial 
oligarchies at a competitive advantage due to implicit public insurance.48 The so-called Big 
Bang, a series of changes to the Stock Exchange introduced in 1986, allowed banks to enter 
into capital markets in a major way.49 Second, there was an increasing demand for financial 
services among the UK population.50 The rising demand was driven by the emergence of 
consumer society, rising incomes, electronic payment of wages and increased rates of 
homeownership.51 Further, Leyshon and Thrift argue that the international debt crisis 
encouraged the UK financial institutions to focus on developed economy markets, thus 
fuelling a massive growth in the domestic consumer market in the 1980s.52 
In the context of these changes, British banks implemented a number of changes to 
the retail banking operations. Banks increasingly sought to centralise and automate back-
office operations to reduce costs,53 ease physical overcrowding on branches54 and deal with 
the growing number of customers and transactions.55 This process started already in the mid-
1960s to mid-70s with the automation of transaction and financial records.56 Midland Bank 
extended mechanised book-keeping to all branches in the late 1950s and embarked on a 
computerisation of a number of branch operations, including cheque clearing and standing 
orders, in the 1960s.57 This automation of internal processes in the 1950s and 60s combined 
with product innovation led to the creation of electronic fund transfer systems in the 70s and 
80s and ATMs were a key element in expanding these.58 The literature suggests that this 
process accelerated in the 1980s and 90s. Storey et al note that in the 1990s there was a trend 
among British banks centralising back-office operations into processing centres.59 In their 
study of business process reengineering in a medium-sized UK bank, Knights and McCabe 
found that technological advances in online customer databases and communications enabled 
the bank to centralise and restructure its operations removing all non-sales activities from 
branches in the late 1980s and early 90s.60 In another study, McCabe found that a major 
British retail bank centralised all back-office operations into seven processing centres.61  
In tandem with the centralisation of the centralisation of back-office operations, there 
was an increasing emphasis on sales in branches. The remaining branch staff were 
increasingly focused on sales.62 The process of centralisation involved a fundamental change 
in how the bank conducted its business with a greater focus on sales.63 To encourage this 
shift, British banks started introducing performance-related pay widely in the 1990s with pay 
raises depending on performance ratings.64 According to Storey et al, Coop operated with 
performance management approach for all staff, whilst Lloyds and Abbey National operated 
with performance-related pay in the 1990s.65 The testimonies by the branch managers support 
this as they report that targets were being scaled up and intensified considerably in the late 
1980s and 90s.  
In the 1990s, British banks sought to further rationalise the branch network through 
outright branch closures and by clustering branches under a single management structure. 
Between 1983 and 1989 the number of bank branches fell from 36,788 to 34,535.66 Between 
1995 and 2003, British banks and converted building societies closed 22% and 19% of their 
branches.67 Before merging with Lloyds in 1995, TSB grouped its branches into clusters of 8-
10 under a senior manager and transferred its back-office operations to processing centres 
leading to a loss of 2,000 managers.68 Sub-branches were not a new concept in banking as 
banks had operated with these throughout their history.69 However, the large-scale 
downgrading of full-service branches to sub-branches on a systematic basis to rationalise the 
branch network was a new development. Midland embarked on a similar strategy in the early 
1990s, whilst Barclays centralised later but to a greater degree.70 Lloyds ‘embarked on a 
radical plan to reduce its head count and change jobs, while rationalizing its branch network 
following its merger with TSB.’71 In Scotland, RBS ’created a system of group offices to deal 
with business customers’ in 1992, which was implemented largely in cities.72 Credit scoring 
facilitated the concentration of decision-making in a few branches by reducing the need for 
technical capacity at branch level.73 First used in the mail order industry in the 1970s, credit 
scoring was not introduced extensively in retail banking until the 1980s when decision-
making in consumer lending was transferred to centralised processing centres.74 In the US, 
credit scoring industry emerged in the late 1950s with the pioneering work by Fair, Isaac and 
Company Incorporated.75 
 
The role of the bank branch manager 
The vast majority of the managers interviewed entered banking between the mid to late 1950s 
and late 1960s, early 1970s during a period of large-scale recruitment into the sector. Most of 
them entered banking around the age of 16 or 17 on completing O-levels or equivalent 
degree, as indeed is the case for the sector more broadly. The respondents started in junior 
clerical positions and worked their way through senior clerk through to branch manager and 
or in some cases regional management. Typically the interviewees moved from junior clerk 
to cashiering and securities to senior clerk before promotion to branch or assistant branch 
manager. Branch positions tended to be interspersed with positions within lending control at 
regional offices or inspection teams. The moves were determined by the banks based on their 
needs and their assessment of the skills and qualities of the employees. Importantly, the 
interviewees saw the bank career as a route to progression through to white-collar profession 
and social mobility, as many of them came from working class backgrounds. As suggested by 
the quote above, it was often parents and family members that recognised the opportunity the 
banking career represented: 
My father was a baker’s rounds man delivering to people’s doors. I think his idea was he 
wanted me to do something better than he’d been able to do… He was of the opinion, 
because he was out in all weathers, he delivered bread when it was pouring with rain, 
snow on the ground or whatever it might be, whereas he thought probably that I ought to 
be indoors somewhere. So I think generally it was probably his wish and perhaps mine 
that you want to try to do a bit better than what dad did and so that’s how finance came 
along. 
William, branch manager, Barclays, mid to late 80s 
The role of the bank branch manager was largely focused on business lending. 
Business lending was the main generator of income as well as an aspect over which managers 
had some influence. In the absence of price competition, there was limited scope to compete 
with other banks over personal customers. Business lending was a source of considerable 
status for the bank branch managers. According to the interviewees, the amount of lending 
the managers could underwrite reflected the trust placed in them by their employer, as 
suggested by the quote below: 
I was given a personal lending authority of £100,000. So, in other words, I could see a 
customer, I could lend up to £100,000 without having to go anywhere else for approval, 
and at that time in [East Midlands town] there was [a number of other banks] and I could 
lend £100,000 and the nearest to me was [name other bank] and he could lend £30,000, 
but only if it was credit scored 
Jonathan, branch manager, Midland/HSBC, early to mid-00s 
Moreover, lending was seen as a main pathway for promotion. Management roles at 
and above branch level were largely focused on lending and lending control. Conversely the 
loss of such authority was seen as a blemish on someone’s career, as it essentially meant that 
the person had made poor or fraudulent lending decisions: 
I mean we used to have a phrase ‘transfer to duties where his signature is no longer 
required.’ It was a circular that came out every day, which listed all the appointments. 
‘Mr Smith has gone to Brown’s branch and Mr Brown’s gone and then you find so and 
so branch, Mr Smith has been transferred to duties where his signature is no longer 
required.’ Having your signature cancelled was very serious, because you’re back to 
being, as you say, a clerk in a back office. If you worked in one of the head office 
departments, like coupon office, that’s because you besmirched your career 
Martin, branch manager, Midland/HSBC, late-80s to early 90s 
The role of the bank branch manager was seen as successfully balancing the needs 
and demands of staff, customers and the bank. Although making a profit for the bank was 
ultimately seen as the main objective, it was felt that this had to be balanced with the needs of 
the staff and the customers. In particular, serving long-term needs of customers important to 
underpin the long-term viability of the branch: 
So that was the objective of the exercise, to be there for the long term with customers and 
give them advice that would be good for them for the long term. Not just a quick fix. I’ll 
lend the money today and get the benefit of the interest rate and it’ll sort itself out, 
probably, in a few years’ time. 
Barry, branch manager, Barclays, early 80s to mid-90s 
The interviewees identified three elements as important in fulfilling the role as the 
bank branch manager. First, the manager had to serve as the figurehead of the bank and be 
seen by the local community as acting on behalf of the bank: 
Well, you were very much the figurehead, the representative of the bank in the district… 
I think we still had a certain standing and we were expected to belong to the local rotary 
club and the chamber of trade and perhaps the golf club or whatever it might be. The 
function of the manager was, as I said, to be the focal point in people’s mind of the 
branch. 
Robin, branch manager, Barclays, mid 70s to late 80s 
Presence in community forums and organisations, such as business roundtables, rotary 
clubs and boards of charitable organisations and schools, was seen as important to convey 
this message. This is corroborated by Savage et al who argue that from the late nineteenth 
century through to the 1960s, employees of Lloyds Bank were encouraged to maintain the 
bank’s local reputation by participating in local status community.76 For the most part, the 
branch managers interviewed engaged with the local professional and business community 
with the purpose of acquiring new business and local market intelligence used in 
underwriting. 
Second, the branch manager had to have the authority and autonomy to make 
decisions on behalf of bank. This largely, though not exclusively, centred on discretion in 
lending. Provided the branch was profitable and run properly, the managers reported enjoying 
a relatively high level of autonomy. The make-up of the portfolio and the activities of the 
branch were left at the discretion of the managers as illustrated by the quote below: 
I: When you came to [market town in Midlands] [early 80s], there wasn’t, sort of, like, 
this is what we expect you to do, these and these areas and this is something about things 
you are expected to do? 
 
R: No. Just develop the business, Barry… Yeah. We expect you to do well. We think you 
can do well. Good luck. And that was it… I was left to my own devices how I developed 
the business. Whether I looked to lend more money or get credit balances or sell 
insurance 
Barry, branch manager, Barclays, early 80s to mid-90s 
Third, the branch manager had to have the skills to exercise such authority. Part of 
this arose from formal training, especially the Institute of Banker’s exams, which was a 
prerequisite for promotion beyond senior clerical roles.77 Such training provided technical 
and codifiable skills, including valuing of assets, budgeting and cash flow projections. 
Additionally there were tacit and soft skills, which were perceived to be a combination of 
innate skills and skills acquired through ongoing practice, partly under the tutelage of a more 
experience manager. This is akin to craftsmanship in the sense that it is based on ongoing 
practice and apprenticeship.78 There was a sense that the skills could only be acquired over 
time and relatively slowly. People could not simply be parachuted into branch management 
positions on the back of a graduate training programme: 
In the old days, you were brought through the tradition of banking and you went through 
the ranks. Each branch had its own full process and therefore you’d have a junior. I’ll 
always remember the first job I had was to stick stamps on envelopes and write the 
address on the envelopes. And so early banking, and we were trained in traditional ways 
of banking. You’d go through the different stages, becoming a cashier, and then you 
went on to qualify. 
Matthew, branch manager, Midland/HSBC, early 80s to mid-90s 
As suggested by the quote above, there was a sense among the interviewees that one 
had to have experience of all aspects of the branch to manage it in an effective manner. 
The demise of the traditional bank branch manager 
As discussed above, a multitude of developments were afoot since the late 1980s affecting 
the nature of the banking sector in which the interviewees were working in a number of ways. 
But how did branch managers experience them at the time and what did they see as the most 
significant developments for themselves and their profession? The experiences, impact and 
views of these developments among the branch managers interviewed were complex and 
multifaceted. Some were largely unaffected by the changes because they left banking before 
they were implemented or were too senior by the time of their introduction. Others were 
made redundant, changed career paths or took early retirement. Similarly, there were 
managers that saw developments as inevitable and sensible, whilst others questioned if they 
were beneficial for customers and more effective. In particular, there was disagreement about 
if the judgement and experience of branch managers was more reliable in the underwriting of 
business loans compared with credit scored lending. Nevertheless, they all thought that the 
developments affected the bank branch manager profession in a profound way. Of the 
numerous developments in banking detailed above, three were felt to especially affect the 
interviewees and their profession more generally: the centralisation of lending and 
administration in large branches or processing centres, the introduction of business credit 
scoring, and the increased focus on sales and the intensification of targets. These are now 
discussed in turn.  
The branch managers thought that, over time, the centralisation of lending and 
administration undermined role of branches as gateways for services. As account 
administration was done elsewhere, the branch and its manager could not address problems 
associated with customer accounts weakening the link between branches and its customers.79 
It also eroded the traditional career pathway, as there were fewer entry-level and management 
positions at branch-level.80 The centralisation of decision-making, especially concerning 
business lending, through grouping branches or establishing specialist business lending 
centres enabled the removal of the branch manager and replacement by clerical staff: 
It was a way of taking managers out of the branches and in their place were people who 
were appointed clerks 
Marcus, branch manager, Midland/HSBC, late 80s to early 90s 
Managers of affected branches were transferred into specialist centres, made 
redundant or given early retirement and were replaced by senior clerical staff or assistant 
managers.81 The centralisation of lending profoundly the branch manager’s role: 
1980 through to 1983, the bank was reorganising the whole network…lending was taken 
out of branches and this is a significant change for you. Lending was taken out of 
branches and centralised in an area office. You left the branch manager there, but he only 
did very small personal lending and take operational responsibility. You deskilled his 
job. That, I think, was significant. 
Martin, branch manager, Midland/HSBC, late 80s to early 90s 
The removal of responsibility for business lending was crucial given its historically 
important role in the activities of the branch manager. As much of the perceived skills and 
experience of the branch managers lay in business lending, its removal signified a significant 
downgrading and deskilling of their role. Ultimately, with the development of new 
technology, many interviewees recognised, there was no longer a need for managers in small 
branches: 
It was part of the reorganisation. Basically cutting costs by taking managers out of 
branches and because of computerisation…now technology was really taking over and 
computerisation was coming in place, which is a great aid to the manager… All this 
information was there by the click of your fingers… You didn’t need managers in situ in 
small branches lending small amounts of money. They might have been great characters 
in the town but they were a great cost and a lot of this could now be done by 
computerisation. 
Brian, branch manager, Barclays, early 80s to mid-90s 
The interviewees noted the introduction of credit scoring, especially for business 
lending, as another important development affecting branch managers. Credit scoring was 
being introduced into British banks in the 1980s and 1990s to reduce costs, cope with greater 
number of customers, to improve the quality of lending and reduce bad debts.82 The loan 
interview was blamed for many of the poor lending decisions increasing bad debts in the 
1980s and 1990s.83 The interviewees reported that credit scoring was introduced gradually 
starting with personal and then small business lending. Initially it was also advisory and 
branch managers could override decisions, but then it became increasingly difficult to 
override. Edelman reported this to be the case for Bank of Scotland as well.84 
Generally the interviewees viewed credit scoring for personal lending as a necessity 
and furthermore did not perceive this as a threat to their role as this largely focused on 
business lending. Some also recognised that credit scoring enabled managers to spend more 
time on other aspects and that it proved more accurate in predicting lending outcomes than 
branch managers. However, most interviewees objected to underwriting business loans 
through credit scoring on a number of accounts. They felt that it undermined their judgement 
and the importance of tacit knowledge. They feared that it would lead to poor lending 
decisions: 
But business lending is definitely a much finer art and I defy anyone to say that it can be 
done on a pure credit scoring basis. 
Sean, branch manager, other bank, mid-80s to late 90s 
Additionally, it was pointed out that credit scoring jeopardised branch managers’ 
relationship with customers. On the one hand, it could mean end of long-term customer 
relations. On the other, it prevented managers from protecting customers from themselves: 
On the personal side we started credit scoring personal loans in 1982-ish, I think… And I 
got told off for overriding some of the credit scoring positives… For the personal 
lendings and saying…we know this chap’s history, we’ve looked at it. We don’t think, 
you know, he can afford this. Think this might be too much of a burden for him… I was 
told that’s not relevant. I mean, the bank actually said that. 
Barry, branch manager, Barclays, early 80s to mid-90s    
Indeed, the willingness of banks to lend, especially to small businesses, was a 
recurring theme of numerous Parliamentary enquiries during the 20th century since the 1931 
Macmillan Committee report concluded that there was a financing gap for companies seeking 
finance of up to £200,000.85 There have been resurging debates since then about if banks 
have been sufficiently supportive of small businesses. Credit scoring removed responsibility 
for customer outcomes away from managers and protected them from consequences of 
default: 
And if the loan went into default, you were, sort of, from the branch point of view you 
were protected because it was credit scored and it passed the credit score at the time. 
Laurence, branch manager, Midland/HSBC, early 90s to early 00s 
This was also the case in a Bank of Scotland subsidiary introducing credit scoring in 
the 1980s, where the transferral of responsibility for lending outcomes was highlighted by the 
bank as a major selling point vis-à-vis employees.86 
Finally, the interviewees identified the introduction and extension of targets as a 
significant development for their profession. Performance targets were brought in from the 
1980s to replace the previous loose focus on profit, costs and performance. Although not 
directly removing discretion, they were aimed at curtailing the autonomy of branch managers. 
As with credit scoring, the interviews suggest that they were introduced gradually. There 
were initially few, flexible targets not linked to performance and the banks had no real 
infrastructure or staff dedicated to monitor and enforce them. Then, in the 1990s, 
interviewees reported that there was an escalation of the targets regime. The number of 
targets increased and many were linked to the growth in ancillary services. They were 
increasingly sophisticated, allowing for the detailed capturing of information about staff 
activities and contribution to profits, and were linked to pay. The targets were also monitored 
with increased intensity and frequency, as per the quote below: 
The area director, I’d have him probably on the telephone almost every day saying, right 
what’s going on. What are you selling? What’s going well? What’s not going well? What 
are you doing about it? 
Sean, branch manager, other bank, mid-80s to late 90s 
The experiences of targets did differ. Some valued them in managing staff 
performance and did not have any issues meeting them. However, most thought that the early 
targets were acceptable and appropriate but that the intensification of the target regime and its 
perceived inflexibility were highly problematic for three reasons. First, it signalled the lack of 
trust in branch managers’ ability to do job, thus compromising their role as representative for 
bank in local community. Second, they felt it pressurised branch managers into making poor 
lending decisions and abandoning prudent lending practices because of emphasis on 
acquiring new business. Finally, some interviewees noted that it meant putting the interests of 
the bank above that of the duty of care towards the customer: 
the thing that really impressed on me when on my first lending course went, was…when 
you lend money you have a duty of care, obviously, to the bank to get the money back, 
but you have duty of care to the customer to only lend the money that is in their interest. 
If you lend somebody money just because they’ve asked for it and they can’t pay it back 
you are not doing…him or her a favour. You have a duty of care to your customer. And 
that was starting to go… Instead of being the bank’s representative passing down policy I 
was almost trying to shield the customers and the staff from what the bank was doing and 
it was frustrating fight. It was a losing battle because I was told that wasn’t my job, to get 
on with it 
Harry, branch manager, Midland/HSBC, late 70s to late 90s 
As suggested by the quote, the significance of the changes in banking was not merely 
about the impact on job descriptions and procedures. Rather, the interviewees thought that the 
changes were important because they perceived them to be part of a wider cultural change in 
banking, especially the abandonment of paternalism and conservative lending principles in 
favour of greater focus on sales and profit. 
Conclusion 
British banks underwent a transformation from the late 1980s onwards. From being a risk 
averse, conservative sector providing a handful of financial services largely to middle class 
customers through its extensive branch network, banks became global conglomerates 
providing a wide range of services to a mass consumer market through a number of channels, 
including telephone, Internet and branch. This article seeks to make a contribution to our 
understanding of this period through analysing the role and perspective of the bank branch 
manager, who found himself at the heart of this transformation. 
The bank branch managers interviewed saw themselves as authoritative, and 
autonomous craftsmen using their skill, judgement and training to balance the perceived 
needs of the bank, its customers and staff. The discretion and expertise in business lending 
was especially important in terms of status and promotion. From the 1980s onwards, British 
banks introduced a number of changes that struck at the core of the professional identity and 
career of existing and aspiring bank branch managers at the time. The interviewees felt that 
their autonomy as branch managers was curtailed by the intensification of the targets regime 
in the 1980s and 1990s as targets became more numerous, more sophisticated and monitored 
with greater vigour. The authority of many branch managers was curtailed by the 
concentration of business lending discretion in dedicated lending units or in larger branches, 
and by the progressive introduction and extension of credit scoring. As alluded to by the 
phrase ‘computer says no’ in the title, the interviewees felt that these changes reduced the 
role of the bank branch manager to conveying automated or centrally made decisions to 
customers. These changes resulted in the deskilling of the branch manager by not involving 
him in the decision-making (underwriting and analysis) and disempowered the role by 
removing his ability to influence or perhaps even explain decisions. 
  
On the one hand, these changes affected the bank branch manager as a profession. 
The findings presented in this article suggest that the changes in banking undermined the 
professional identity of branch managers through curbing and removing their autonomy and 
authority to make local decisions on behalf of bank. The transformation also led to a 
deterioration of career prospects for existing and aspiring branch managers. The demise of 
the traditional bank branch manager can be understood in the wider context of the 
disappearance of the generalist banking profession. According to Storey et al: ‘The traditional 
rounded banker who was rotated through a wide range of general banking functions to gain 
the necessary experience for managerial position is now seen as an inappropriate model.’87 
Examining the restructuring of the branch network in a UK bank, Knights and McCabe argue 
that ’the restructuring involved a change in the “way of life” for branch staff and 
management, threatening their identity, social ties, job security, and their career promotion.’88 
The changes to the bank branch manager role and the experiences and perspectives of the 
interviewees of these should be understood in context cultural change in orientation towards 
sales, from paternalistic to performance-orientated staff management.89  
On the other, the changes of the bank branch manager may have implications for the 
perceived impersonal nature of modern banking. The changes in banking undermined the 
authority and autonomy of the branch manager through centralisation of and the imposition 
of greater central control over local activities. At the heart Weber’s thesis of bureaucratisation 
and dehumanisation is the removal of discretion to root out case-to-case judgements based on 
consideration of individuals affected by or involved in decision-making. This, in turn, is 
driven by rationalisation, the increasing orientation towards the execution of planned actions 
to achieve organisational objectives. Rationalisation drives depersonalisation as it encourages 
a move from a case-by-case approach with the opportunity to take emotional judgements 
about persons into account to a uniform treatment regardless of the person or his or her 
circumstances. The agency of frontline staff is crucial in personalising services because it 
allows them to give consideration for those involved and affected by decisions, including 
their person (i.e. perceived character, standing or association etc.) and the circumstances in 
which they find themselves. The implication of this is that decision-making may be driven by 
nepotism, discrimination or favouritism as well as solidarity, loyalty or compassion. The loss 
of agency for bank branch managers and its implications for the ability of branch managers to 
take human considerations is, therefore, a mechanism for depersonalising services. Hence, 
this concept complements the existing literature around dehumanisation, which has clarified 
different forms of dehumanisation and its cognitive underpinnings90 and defined 
numericalization as ‘grounded in discourses and disciplines such as accounting, operations, 
technology and strategy.’91 In particular, it identifies the agency, or more precisely its 
removal, as a potentially important mechanism in depersonalising service provision rather 
than technology per se. This may help explain the deterioration of levels of customer 
satisfaction and trust in banking, especially concerning customer complaints about the 
inflexibility or remoteness of banks. 
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